Introduction
In a recent book, Neil Levy argues that culpable action-action for which we are morally responsible-is necessarily produced by states of which we are consciously aware. 1 However, criminal defendants are routinely held responsible for criminal harm caused by states of which they are not conscious in Levy's sense. The discrepancy between Levy's assessment and the criminal law's assessment of these cases seems significant: Levy's theory indicates that many criminal defendants held responsible under the doctrine of negligence are not actually morally responsible agents. This is especially worrying for those who support the US Model Penal Code's appeal to retribution as the primary purpose for criminal punishment, as retribution depends upon defendants' moral blameworthiness. 2 In this chapter I will argue that cases of negligent criminal harm indicate that Levy's claim that moral responsibility requires synchronic conscious awareness of the moral significance of an act is too strict. Further, I will claim that tracing conditions cannot be successfully used to bolster Levy's account. Instead, current legal practices 1 NEIL LEVY, CONSCIOUSNESS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (2014) . indicate that criminal responsibility requires the capacity for diachronic agency and selfcontrol, not synchronic conscious control. This means that an agent may be responsible for harm related to lapses (failures of memory or judgment) even if he or she at no point could have reasonably foreseen the possibility of causing criminal harm. The criminal law aims not only to sway conscious decision-making in the time slice immediately preceding a crime, but also to motivate agents to become law-abiding over time via diachronic self-interventions, including manipulating one's dispositions to act and environment. Such self-interventions can make it more or less likely that an agent will be prone to lapses that cause criminal harm.
I. Levy's Consciousness Thesis
In a recent book, Neil Levy argues that both of the best candidates for conditions for moral responsibility require that culpable action is necessarily produced by states of which we are consciously aware. 3 Only conscious states reflect 'real' or 'deep' agency, as required by 'deep self' views of responsibility; thus Levy claims such theories require that culpable action issue from conscious states. 4 Similarly, the sort of self-control required for responsibility under volitional or control accounts of responsibility also require conscious awareness. 5 Consciousness functions to allow for top-down deliberative control, where action can be related to an agent's long-term plans, memories, and values; whereas non-conscious states are associative, and only produce rigid 'action 3 <IBT>Levy, supra note 1</IBT>. 4 Id.
routines'. 6 Thus Levy argues that consciousness is a necessary condition under both sorts of theories-and, he insinuates, any viable theory of moral responsibility.
Levy's account is grounded in neuroscience, and is quite specific regarding what conscious awareness consists in from a scientific perspective. Levy ascribes to a version of the Global Workspace Theory (GWT) of consciousness, a theory first developed by Baars. 7 Global workspace theory posits that consciousness functions to coordinate and control cognitive activity by allowing widespread access across regions of the brain.
Specifically, consciousness signals a connection between the prefrontal regions, which house the executive functions that provide top-down control mechanisms, and posterior regions, which house memory and other representational content, including the sorts of content that are important to the 'self'-values, long-term plans, memories, emotions, Behaviour generated by 'sub-conscious action routines', by contrast, is inflexible, domain-specific, stereotyped, and associative. This is not only because the executive is not engaged, but also because the representational content the executive works on tends to be modular. Levy provides the classic example of unconscious behaviour in his book:
sleepwalking. In the much-discussed 1996 Canadian case, Kenneth Parks, who had a history of sleep abnormalities, got up from his bed and drove 26 kilometers to his inlaws' home, where he proceeded to stab both of them with a knife, resulting in the death of his mother-in-law and severe wounds to his father-in-law. 13 In Bert's case, the judge indicated that if she let Bert avoid culpability for the lapse that resulted in the abandonment of his children, the criminal law would fail in its aim of encouraging parents to remember and meet their responsibilities to their children.
This seems right. Failure to apply consequences for lapses might actually encourage agents to create circumstances where they are more likely to lapse. One can imagine a father who, as soon as he notices his ex-wife is about to give him instructions on care of their children, only half listens, so that the information is very difficult to recall. The father may do this precisely because he doesn't want to be burdened with her instructions. 25 When he later fails to take his child to the science fair and the child fails science, it seems that the father is not just responsible for not paying attention to his exwife's instructions, but also for failing to take his child to the science fair, because he should have paid attention and remembered his ex-wife's instructions. Similarly, a parent like Bert might fail to buy a calendar (or, to put the point in more modern terms, fail to buy a phone with a calendar app), just so that they can claim they didn't remember because they don't possess a reminder system.
Thus there seem to be good reasons to worry about Levy's claim that lapses don't express agency. I will discuss these worries in detail below. In addition, Levy's claim that 24 Id. 25 Levy might argue in this case that the conscious decision not to pay attention displays the father's quality of will, and the father has responsibility for the later lapse because it can be traced back to this conscious decision. Tracing introduces new problems, however. I discuss these in the next section.
we don't hold people morally responsible for 'one off' lapses seems incorrect. The appropriate level of responsibility applied for a lapse often depends not only on whether the agent exhibits a pattern of lapses, but on the degree of harm caused by the lapse. If
Rob's life partner, Tim, forgets to take out the trash, Rob may be annoyed, but he also may feel like he should not hold his partner responsible, especially if there were extenuating circumstances (maybe Tim was on his way to an important job interview).
26
But if Tim forgets to come to a biopsy scheduled on a possibly cancerous nodule they found in Rob's thyroid, Rob is very likely to hold Tim morally responsible, even if Tim has never exhibited this sort of lapse before. In other words, some one-off lapses may be excusable, but others-where there are important reasons to remember-seem like clear cases where an agent should be held directly morally responsible for the forgetting.
Levy might just disagree with the legal and folk practice of holding persons responsible for harm causally related to lapses, and claim that Bert and Tim are not morally responsible or deserving of punishment. This seems problematic in Bert's case, however. On most contemporary views of the law the law seeks to both regulate human conduct and punish moral wrongdoing. 27 Thus even if Levy can make a convincing case that Bert is not morally responsible for the abandonment of his children, there seem to be 26 There is of course an important distinction between Rob holding his partner responsible, and Tim being criminally punished. I will discuss this a bit later in the chapter.
27 Most scholars and US penal codes embrace a hybrid theory regarding the purposes of law, which embrace both backward-looking proportional punishment and forwardlooking deterrence aims. See, for example, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
good forward-looking reasons to punish Bert for his lapse. Fines and criminal punishment are important means by which the law motivates citizens to be law-abiding, and lapse cases seem ripe for the imposition of punishment as a means to encourage law-abiding behaviour. This is because lapses that harm others or violate the social order are often easily avoided. Our tax system is a good example: in the US, hefty fines are levied against those who forget to file their taxes, and the possible imposition of such fines encourages the majority of citizens to file their taxes on time (or ask for an extension).
Similarly, the imposition of punishment for forgetting to care for one's children would seem to be an effective means to encourage some parents to take their parenting duties seriously. Parents like Bert who share custody ought to ensure they do not forget the dates when they have custody, and knowledge that one may be faced with a criminal penalty for forgetting would seem to be motivating to at least some potentially forgetful parents.
Thus I think it is not feasible for Levy to take the position that lapse cases ought never to be criminally punished due to the lapsing agent's lack of moral responsibility. It appears that Levy is left with two options for handling such cases: (1) attempt to hold lapsers morally responsible using tracing conditions (such that they can be punished in keeping with the aim of retribution); or (2) support punishment in lapse cases despite a lack of moral responsibility based upon purely forward-looking aims, such as deterrence and incapacitation. I discuss both of these options below.
III. Tracing Similarly, if Bert made a conscious decision not to pay attention when he discussed the custody schedule with his ex-girlfriend, or consciously dismissed the idea of writing down the schedule, he is indirectly morally responsible for the abandonment of his children. In this case it would be reasonably foreseeable that Bert's conscious decision not to listen or set a reminder might lead him to forget the parenting schedule.
However, the actual evidence presented in the case doesn't support this sort of account regarding Bert's lapse. There had been a brief in-person conversation some weeks before the lapse between Bert and his ex-girlfriend about the schedule. This discussion occurred after Bert dropped off the kids while the two were standing outside of his ex-girlfriend's apartment. Afterward Bert had failed to write the schedule down or set a reminder. Bert didn't own a calendar or a date book, and testified that he never wrote down any of his appointments (this was before the days of electronic calendars via cell phones). Importantly, Bert claimed that it never occurred to him to write down the schedule or set a reminder, despite the fact that the parenting schedule changed a lot 30 See Vargas for a full explanation of this approach: Id.
because he often asked to switch weekends with his ex-girlfriend or not take his parenting time, and sometimes she asked to switch. Bert's ex-girlfriend agreed that she had never known him to keep a calendar or write down appointments. Tracing works, says King, only when the prior decision or action meets two conditions:
(1) the agent is responsible for that earlier decision or action; and (2) 35 King also thinks that although most intuit that Nate is responsible for negligence, there are no principled means to distinguish Nate from cases like the one of Leadfoot Lenny, who inadvertently steps on his friend's hand when he gets up from the sofa to get a soda and is distracted by the movie playing. Both Nate and Larry should have paid more attention, and both violated some duty to take care (though one duty seems more important than the other), but neither violations can be linked to some prior conscious
IV. Lapses and Legal Negligence
Thus it seems use of tracing conditions will not be sufficient to hold Bert, and some other lapsers, morally responsible for their lapses. Could Levy support criminal punishment of Bert even though he denies Bert is morally responsible for his lapse? To do this Levy's theory would have to be amenable to finding Bert guilty for the harm caused by his lapse using a legal negligence standard, and then support Bert's punishment based upon purely non-retributive, forward-looking aims of punishment such as deterrence and rehabilitation.
I don't think this move is available to Levy. In this section, I will argue that application of the negligence standard requires a minimal level of backward-looking moral culpability, where the negligent agent is morally blameworthy for failing to meet a legally required standard of care. I will claim that on any interpretation of the doctrine of negligence, a defendant's guilt is premised upon his capacity to know and understand the legal standard of care, as well as his capacity to act in a way that meets this standard (or decision. We tend to treat Nate more harshly, King says, because his failure with regard to the duty of care is more serious, but there is no real difference in their cases to be discovered via a tracing condition. One is expected to take more care driving than walking, because the risk of harm to others is greater. Negligence, King concludes, is just a form of inadvertence, in which the expected negative value of inattentive conduct is great.
King concludes that neither Nate nor Lenny are morally responsible for the harms they bring about. I, of course, disagree, because I think there are grounds other than tracing to hold lapsers like Bert responsible.
refrain from acting in a way that violates the standard). Thus legally negligent lapsers are criminally culpable based upon legal criteria that also appear to qualify them for some minimal level of moral blameworthiness.
My overall argument is supported by the principle of correspondence, expressed through the Model Penal Code structure of mens rea requirements, where assessment of a defendant's mens rea aims to ensure that the degree of liability and punishment will be proportionate to a defendant's culpability and limited by it. 36 From this perspective, mens rea requirements reveal a sliding scale of moral culpability, ranging from a high level of culpability when an agent acts for the purpose of causing criminal harm ('purposely'), to slightly less culpable when he didn't act for the purpose of causing harm, but knew harm was likely ('knowingly'), to somewhat culpable when he consciously disregarded a substantial risk to harm ('recklessly'), to minimally culpable when he should have known he was violating a legally required standard of care ('negligently'). The criminal guilt and punishment of negligent actors thus rest upon and correspond to their moral culpability, although this culpability is significantly less than that of one who acts with the higher levels of intent.
In most cases a defendant found guilty of a crime is found to possess conscious mental states with regard to the criminal harm she caused. As indicated above, stricter mens rea requirements demand that the defendant acted for the purpose of achieving the harm or knew the harm was likely to occur. From Levy's perspective, however, applying the negligence standard or strict liability for a lapse, or for action related to any unconscious (implicit) mental state, constitutes punishing a person for criminal harm even though the act that caused the harm neither expressed her deep self, nor was an act over which she had control. In other words, on Levy's view, the criminal harm was not caused by or related to the lapser's agency. In a sense, Levy imagines unconscious mental states and the actions they initiate as something that happen to a person, in the same way that stomach aches or seizures happen to a person. Barring a strong pattern of behaviour or a conscious state to which the lapse can be clearly traced, implicit states, dispositions, and lapses don't belong to a person's agency any more than do the colour of their skin: we attribute allergies and pale skin to an agent, but we will not hold her responsible for sneezing on us or their disposition to sunburn. Retributive punishment thus is not warranted for harm caused by implicit mental states, such as racist beliefs, and lapses in memory or judgement.
In essence, Levy's theory severs the link between a negligent lapser and the criminal harm they cause: it wasn't Bert that caused the criminal harm of his kids being abandoned, but some state of affairs not attributable to Bert. Levy's assessment of a lapser's capacities thus undermines his ability to link the criminal harm to the would-be criminal offender. On this view there seems to be no principled difference between Bert and a person who has an epileptic seizure (lacking reasons to believe he was going to have a seizure) and hits a pedestrian. The seizure does not issue from the driver's agency, thus we do not hold him responsible for the death. The action of having the seizure was 'wholly innocent' and not culpable. On Levy's view, Bert's lapse also did not issue from his agency, so the harm related to this lapse is non-culpable.
However, without minimal culpability, Bert cannot be found guilty of a crime such that he may then be criminally punished. That is, if Bert is not the cause of the criminal harm, any brand of criminal punishment in response to that crime-even purely forward-looking punishment, aiming to shape Bert's future behaviour-is unjustified.
Bert is only a proximate, but not an agential, cause of the criminal harm. A criminal court is not any more justified in applying punishment to Bert than it would be in punishing the epileptic driver, or (to use a modified version of an example from Aristotle) a man blown by a strong wind into the path of a cyclist who is then hurt when he falls off his bike.
Criminal responsibility requires that the criminal harm be caused by a voluntary act.
There is no voluntary act in these cases to justify a criminal court exercise jurisdiction and initiation of the process of determination of guilt. So the answer to the question posited at the beginning of this section regarding whether Levy can punish Bert despite his lack of moral responsibility must be 'no'.
A related argument is made by Nicole Vincent in a 2011 article titled 'A capacity, etc.), and these considerations provide the parameters-generally, the upper limit-of appropriate punishment. 61 Secondarily, questions regarding whether the offender needs to be incapacitated via incarceration; whether certain types of punishment are likely to deter other offenders similar to this offender in the future; and whether certain punishments will rehabilitate (or will reduce the possibility of rehabilitation) are considered. As a result of this balancing process, punishment ought to be proportional to crime and offender but also aim to reduce recidivism.
For example, consider Bert's punishment for child abandonment. It seems that
Bert's sentence of probation was proportional to his fairly minor level of moral blameworthiness (when compared to other moral wrongs that constitute a crime). Bert seems to be a good candidate for social criticism and forward-looking criminal punishment because he, and similarly situated parents, may be deterred from future lapses and encouraged to change their attitudes and habits in response to Bert's punishment. In comparison, the parent who leaves his child in the hot car may bear moral responsibility, but is very likely not to need social criticism as a deterrent from future similar lapses; and similarly, news of a child dying in a hot car alone is likely to impact other parents' behaviour, regardless of whether punishment is applied in response to the death. That is, 61 Note that Morris indicated retributive sentiment ought to provide upper, but not lower, limits for sentencing. Morris, supra note 58. the death of the child is more likely to have a deterrent effect on parents than is a criminal punishment in response to the death.
Ideally, Bert's punishment would include rehabilitative treatment, such as parenting classes. One especially appealing aspect of the diachronic self-control view is that it highlights the importance of rehabilitative punishment for strengthening offenders'
self-control and decreasing recidivism. The self-interventions discussed above (engineering one's environment, intervening on one's future self by making commitments to future behaviour, and practising and strengthening the processes of selfcontrol) can be taught or encouraged by rehabilitative programming such as anger management, parenting classes, and even yoga, gardening, and chess. 62 The former interventions can attempt to increase self-control within the specific domain of an offender's crime, and the latter can act to increase self-control across domains.
Ultimately, offenders and society in general will benefit if criminal punishment results in enhanced, instead of undermined, self-control in criminal offenders.
Conclusion
From the perspective of the criminal law, Levy's claim that synchronic conscious is necessary for moral responsibility seems too strict. Within the short synchronic window immediately preceding criminal harm, lapsing agents may appear to lack control over harm caused by their lapse because they do not have conscious awareness of the moral implications of their lapse. Further, it is not always possible to trace back to some earlier synchronic moment where such moral implications were reasonably foreseeable by the agent. Thus Levy's theory designates many persons currently held criminally responsible for harm caused by lapses as not morally responsible for such harm. Lapsers therefore cannot be criminally punished under the doctrine of negligence on Levy's theory, even via appeal to purely forward-looking aims of punishment, because criminal punishment of any offender requires minimal moral culpability.
I think this is a worrying result. The law criminalizes negligent acts related to lapses in furtherance of social order, in an attempt to minimize the amount of serious harm caused to citizens. There can be no doubt that lapses can undermine social order and cause serious harm to others, and that agents can be encouraged by the threat of punishment to take steps to avoid lapses. (Criminal punishment for statutory rape, and fines levied against persons who fail to file their taxes on time, seem to be good examples of this.) The law's negligence doctrine thus seems to rest not upon synchronic conscious agency, but on agents' broader capacity for diachronic self-control, which allows them to perform self-interventions to make it more likely they will be law-abiding. The doctrine of negligence, on this view, can be seen as an attempt to influence persons' diachronic self-control and hold defendants responsible when they fail to self-intervene over time such that they lapse and cause criminal harm. This is because the criminal law aims not only to sway conscious decision-making in the time slice immediately preceding a crime, but also to motivate them to become law-abiding over time via diachronic selfinterventions, including manipulating one's dispositions to act and environment.
